The future of American conservatism, or “movement” conservatism, as it is known, has become linked to the outcomes of the Trump administration. It seems impossible to speak of its future without reference to President Trump’s influence.
Yet it is also becoming clearer every day that the future of conservatism will be determined by ideas and events that Trump will not control. The choice faced by American conservatives will not only be which way forward in a post-Trump political sense, but how much of the path chosen will be paved by a president with little of a domestic agenda beyond the One Big Beautiful Bill.
Many conservatives joined Donald Trump a decade ago, attracted by his ability to win one, and then two presidential elections. Trump offered new possibilities for power and brought hope to conservatives who believed that their ideas, groups, leaders, and influencers would coalesce around a common MAGA agenda involving tariffs, industrial policy, restrictive immigration policy, isolationist foreign policy, energy growth, full executive control over the bureaucracy, and crackdowns on higher education’s manifestly dysfunctional culture.
Today, however, progress toward many of these goals have stalled. With Trump approaching lame duck status, conservatives in Congress, activists, journalists, and others seek to define a post-Trump agenda that preserves the “MAGA” brand but is less tied to this administration. Recent events suggest that this will be a difficult task. The problem is that Trump’s approach hasn’t delivered the goods he promised
Take Trump’s obsession with tariffs. Have they, in fact, expanded the manufacturing sector? Do we have more middle-class production jobs? Or, have they weakened and undercut the better parts of the Trump economic agenda, such as capital expensing and energy production? The results of the tariffs haven’t been catastrophic, but they also have not benefited the working classes, let alone the manufacturing sector. Their predictable effect of increasing prices is experienced as annoying, if not a hardship, depending on your household’s level of disposable income. This policy area is one of the biggest dividing lines between MAGA and pre-Trump conservatism. Almost by way of political necessity, the old ideas of supply-side economic policy and the pursuit of economic dynamism seem to be “reentering the chat.”
On foreign policy, Trump has proven willing to take risks in pursuit of American interests abroad, most notably in the Middle East, but also, it now seems, in Latin America. The old conservative notion that a world without American influence is a world more hostile to America seems to have been adopted by Trump. Yet many in MAGA precincts disagree and appear to want to build a post-Trump MAGA that follows distinctly isolationist principles. Here, too, the future seems unclear.
A MAGA Difference?
Certain assumptions of pre-Trump conservatism were proven false. Conservatives did not need to embrace immigration amnesty. China had to be challenged directly. Many cultural and educational institutions required rectification, in some cases necessitating government intervention. On the last point, pre-Trump conservatives were too reluctant to use government power to challenge left-progressives on transgenderism and LGBTQ ideology. Nor did they challenge their attempts to corrupt education with ahistorical, anti-American pedagogy.
The rhetoric of the so-called New Right concentrates on rebuking the small-government consensus that dominated conservative thought in the postwar era. In fact, the two camps have not been as divided as their adherents believe. And Trump’s first presidency did secure important victories in tax policy, judicial appointments, regulatory retrenchment, and foreign policy. Many of these goals were long-standing conservative priorities.
The terrain in Trump’s second term has shifted because of two key parts of MAGA economics: the tariffs imposed on virtually every country, largely on flimsy constitutional authority; and interventions in the economy by the administration, in the form of “golden shares” or public stakes in companies for “national security.” The opposition to these policies and their underlying principles has been intense across various parts of the conservative movement, underscoring once again that no consensus has been reached.
Other liabilities of MAGA conservatism have resurfaced in recent months. The decline of congressional power has ensured that most conservatives in Washington focus, not on rebuilding constitutional government, but on the Trump administration. The inability of MAGA conservatives to pass major legislation that enshrines their goals—which would have been difficult to reverse in future, less favorable political seasons—leaves the institutions of movement conservatism free to jostle with one another. If policy victories cannot be settled in Congress, though, they will likely not be settled by thinktanks or advocacy organizations. This legislative failure points to the fact that, beyond a few core ideas, what MAGA conservatism stands for has never been fully articulated—beyond support for the person of Donald Trump.
In foreign affairs, the vanquishing of Iran and its proxy terrorist outfits, in partnership with an unleashed Israel, seems to have pushed the Middle East in an new direction, more favorable to our interests and to human flourishing overall. Yet many in the MAGA coalition, particularly its younger members, are either indifferent to or against these policies, viewing them as serving Israel rather than focusing on the pressing domestic policy needs of America. MAGA’s foreign policy has not been defined within its own precincts, much less within the rest of the conservative movement. Here, too, it’s hard to say which faction has greater influence.
Trump’s executive orders have gone to the heart of our country’s most contentious debates over gender, immigration, race, energy, the environment, and federal hiring, among other issues. While some of the changes could be permanent, such as the reorganization and substantial personnel reductions at the Department of Education and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, among other agencies, many other MAGA victories made through executive orders are reversible by the next Democratic administration.
I do not dismiss the conservative achievements of this administration within the Executive Branch, nor the victories for executive authority over the federal bureaucracy that could be achieved by this administration in the courts, even if the Trump administration has stretched beyond the breaking point other aspects of presidential power. But the president does not run the whole federal government. MAGA conservatism has failed to establish its priorities within the institution where a populist agenda should gain acceptance—Congress. A Republican-led Congress has shown weakness and has merely followed the lead of the president from the same party.
Congress has been receding from the political stage for decades. But the ongoing erosion of legislative power does no favors to the country and certainly does not promote the cause of constitutional conservatism. Beyond the provision to expense capital-gains purchases and the mishmash of tax cuts in the One Big Beautiful Bill, there is almost no congressional agenda for MAGA conservatism. Meanwhile, federal spending continues to rise at an unsustainable rate. And that is a problem only Congress can address.
MAGA’s Future
What has recently emerged in the absence of actual legislation is a sort of rhetorical populism indulged in by Vice President Vance, Josh Hawley, and lately President Trump. The meatpacking industry should be investigated for price collusion, Trump says. The airline industry is taking advantage of its customers, says Hawley. Encomiums against Big Pharma are now a Republican talking point, a fixed part of Vance’s rhetoric.
Yet none of these efforts will result in more goods and services being available to consumers, i.e., constituents. Before the 2024 election, then-Senator Vance expressed admiration for the Biden administration’s FTC Chairwoman Lina Khan, the only member of his administration he respected. Her approach was to bring “push-the-envelope antitrust cases” against numerous companies, based on progressive theories lacking legal precedent. She lost most of these cases. Should this be seen as a preview of Vance’s and MAGA’s future economic policies horizon?
Where will MAGA and American conservatism go post-Trump? Any serious study of populist movements cannot fail to observe, however, that they tend to rise and fall with the personalities of their leaders. Exceptions exist but are dependent on the answers to the following questions: Are the movement’s grievances, both real and constructed, capable of being redressed by other parties? How durable and instilled are its achievements? What institutions will carry on its legacy? Who is the likely successor? What is MAGA conservatism without Trump?
The track record of MAGA without Trump on the ballot is not impressive. Trump’s policies and politics were recently rebuked in blue states and in a few statewide races in the red states that held elections in November. Note that Trump’s signature domestic policies are currently working at cross-purposes. Favorable rates in the One Big Beautiful Bill are offset by the dramatic tax increases businesses and consumers face due to the rise in the effective tariff rate from 2 to 17.5 percent. Key members of the victorious 2024 coalition, including Latino and other minority voters, switched back to Democratic candidates in the recent midterm elections. Trump’s policies have not met the concerns of marginal members of his coalition, even while they have stoked the fires of the MAGA base.
But the potentially unbridgeable divide concerns Vice President Vance, the near-certain torchbearer of MAGA conservatism. Vance must overcome the challenges posed by his close association with Tucker Carlson, a man he aligned with during his rise to popularity and political success. There is no separating them. Tucker’s influence now extends beyond Vance, threatening the broader MAGA movement with a serious reckoning due to the recurrence of anti-Semitism and racism within its ranks.
The Tucker Question
Outside of Donald Trump, no one has brought greater attention and support to various groups and personalities within the new right than Tucker Carlson has through his Fox News program and, following his 2023 firing from Fox, his podcast, The Tucker Carlson Show. While he clearly sees himself as an heir, in part, to the MAGA legacy, he also intends to move it in an even more radical, if unpredictable, direction. Carlson now regularly gives a platform to Nazi sympathizers, opponents of American intervention in WWII, socialists, Islamists, and foreign adversaries, including leaders of unfriendly nations. Most recently, in a monologue, he bizarrely argued that German Lutheran pastor Dietrich Bonhoeffer, whom the Nazi government executed for participating in the attempted assassination of Adolf Hitler, had not acted as a Christian. The thread running through much of Carlson’s programming and commentary is hatred of Israel scarcely distinguishable from antisemitism and the regular welcome extended to America’s enemies.
Carlson’s main goal appears to be distancing Israel and the Jewish community from the support of American conservatives, including evangelical Christians who back Israel even more than many Jewish Americans. His eulogy of Charlie Kirk in September bizarrely seemed to compare Kirk’s death to that of Jesus. But his description of Christ’s death noted that “Jesus shows up and he starts talking about the people in power and he starts doing the worst thing you can do, which is tell the truth. And they hate it and they just go bonkers. And they become obsessed with making him stop.” Carlson added that he can “picture the scene in a lamp-lit room with a bunch of guys sitting around eating hummus thinking about, ‘What do we do about this guy telling the truth about us. We must make him stop talking!’” That diatribe alone should have moved Carlson outside the bounds of respectability for anyone or any political or policy organization.
Several weeks later, Carlson chose to interview 27-year-old Nick Fuentes, one of the most repulsive figures to emerge in the social media age. Fuentes is known for being a racist and admirer of Hitler, and boasts about women supposedly wanting him to rape them. Fuentes’ followers are in the millions. Carlson didn’t just interview him, but embraced him and his network as junior partners in his political circle. Carlson faced the usual criticism and has relished it all.
Enter Kevin Roberts, President of the DC-based Heritage Foundation. On October 30th, in just three minutes, Roberts exposed the troubling undercurrents within the new right when he defended Carlson from criticism for giving Fuentes a platform. Roberts turned the tables on those criticizing Carlson as “a venomous coalition.” He reaffirmed that Carlson is “a close friend of The Heritage Foundation — and always will be.” Those demanding that Roberts condemn Carlson were acting as a “mouthpiece” in Washington, D.C. for “globalists.” Roberts’s use of coded antisemitic language was notable and widely commented on. Roberts did not even need to address the Carlson issue as Heritage’s president; it wasn’t his fight or Heritage’s.
Or was it?
What appears to be unfolding within MAGA conservatism is an effort to answer the ongoing question of what comes next for this populist movement. Part of the answer is an attempt to redefine its historical origins. Writer and journalist Lee Smith, in an insightful essay for Tablet, argues that Carlson, Roberts, and others have been shifting the movement’s focus away from Trump and onto Patrick Buchanan. Roberts has been spearheading a campaign to persuade President Trump to award Buchanan the Presidential Medal of Freedom. His 1992 presidential run and his overall career are viewed by Roberts, Vice President Vance, and others as the foundation of MAGA, emphasizing isolationism, tariffs, industrial policy, immigration reversal, and possibly a departure from Israel as a close ally. Trump himself has never been consistent in holding these views at the same time.
A Movement of Ideas and Action
In examining the current state of movement conservatism in America, it’s essential to acknowledge that it originated as a movement of ideas, albeit in a limited sense. As historian George Nash accurately describes it, “the objective was not simply to understand the world but to change it, restore it, preserve it.” The very nature of this enterprise meant that it would be a balance on a precipice between principle and politics. The key is to maintain balance.
Nash made this point in his classic The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America Since 1945. Writing in the early ‘70s, Nash noticed that this movement lacked a clear, unified definition of conservatism. Consider how Nash’s book is known for grouping different strands of of thought, including “libertarians,” “traditionalists,” and the “anti-communists,” along with newer categories such as “neoconservatives” and the “religious right.” Conservatives have always been diverse, and from the outset, they were united more by their tensions with one another than by shared, clear-cut principles. How else can we understand the diverse origins of postwar conservatism among its European émigrés, Oklahoma political theorists, former Soviet covert agents, and Tory bohemians?
Conservatism in America is more akin to a church than a sect. A church comprises members who hold related but unfolding understandings, that is, a gradual comprehension over time and experience of the revelation it believes it has received. Different theological schools come to appreciate others without fully grasping their knowledge or seeking to expunge what they do not know. You might have a Franciscan understanding of spirituality in the Catholic Church and never fully grasp what the Jesuits are up to. And that’s okay. Disagreements might abound, even flare at times, but the church goes forward with everyone on board. That’s a church at its best. It’s also a description of American conservatism at its best.
At the political level, this explains the enduring alliance between televangelist Pat Robertson and anti-tax activist Grover Norquist in the 1990s, a decade of conservative triumphs and confusions. There are many such cases. The Reagan presidency itself was the culmination of a diverse array of right-wing ideas and groups, each vying for influence in a White House whose very existence could not be understood without the fissiparous (coming apart) movement that had been growing and evolving for some two generations by then.
What the conservative movement could never afford is a sectarian impulse that insists on rigid orthodoxy and isolates the different groups. Such a spirit would be divisive, bigoted, exclusivist, and dismissive, exhibiting a desire by one or more of its parts to annihilate the others. Some elements of MAGA want to uphold the broad church spirit of the old conservative movement, even though they recognize that its constituent parts are different than they were seven decades ago. Others just want to blow it all up.
Conservatism’s Opportunity
We should step back and gain a historical perspective to better consider what has occurred in the last decade. In Matthew Continetti’s history of conservatism, The Right, a chapter called “The Prairie Fire” homes in on the development of an earlier version of the “new right.” That new right was composed of the National Rifle Association, the recently founded Heritage Foundation, Phyllis Schaffly’s supporters, and the Moral Majority. Today, these movements, institutions, and their descendants are considered part of the conservative “establishment,” but at the time, they were upstarts.
What New Right elements had in common in the aftermath of Nixon and Ford’s presidencies was the conviction that a return to principle was needed. Nixon’s populism had brought in a new working-class constituency, but had not built the institutional Republican Party. Nixon had also grown the federal bureaucracy, imposed price controls, and sought détente with the Soviet Union. If his two terms were a victory for the GOP brand, they were viewed as lost opportunities for the conservative movement. Its denizens instinctively recognized what Ed Feulner, the founder of the Heritage Foundation, stated frequently: “There are no permanent victories.”
But the absence of permanent victories means there are no permanent defeats. There is no such thing as a predetermined future. If movement conservatism seems riven by factions and might enter a cul-de-sac of destructive infighting or worse, we should also remember that this, too, shall pass.
The first step would be to recognize, once again, that our dream is one of opportunity and self-government, not grievance. Grievance degrades the human spirit, leading its practitioners to see fixed spoils that they must capture for themselves. This instinctively leads citizens to devalue one another. The American conservative counterweight to left-wing and right-wing grievance is to proclaim the blessings of liberty rooted in the biblical understanding of man and to make real the hope that this new land, full of our energy, work, dreaming, and love, would rise above the force and fraud of other nations and lands. We would be a blessed people under God. Conservatism’s goal is to make this so.
The next step is to recognize that tension among conservatives reflects tensions within America itself. Many rationales exist for why people find progressivism at odds with their principles and habits. Coordinating these arguments and factions requires humility, prudence, and coalitional thinking.
Some would-be strategists contend that the way to achieve the strongest possible coalition is to adopt the principle of “no enemies to the right”. Yet conservatism does not associate right and wrong with divisions in political combat, but with the human conscience and its need for virtue. The aspiration toward virtue requires naming vice for what it is. One vice of our time is the cheap and tawdry thrills provided by characters like Tucker Carlson and Nick Fuentes. Their hatred and tribalism break not only with decency and goodness, but with the principles of citizenship. To be a church and not a sect, conservatism must rebuild a society of goodwill, freedom, and responsibility, one that will allow Americans to pursue happiness untrammeled by arbitrary authority. But to do that will also require that our own house is in order. We have a rich history to draw from in righting our ship—and America’s.
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